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Criminal Disenfranchisement  
and the Concept of Political Wrongdoing 
Abstract: Disagreement persists about when, if at all, disenfranchisement is a fitting response 
to criminal wrongdoing of type X. Positive retributivists endorse a permissive view of 
fittingness: on this view, disenfranchising a remarkably wide range of morally serious criminal 
wrongdoers is justified. But defining fittingness in the context of criminal disenfranchisement 
in such broad terms is implausible, since many crimes sanctioned via disenfranchisement 
have little to do with democratic participation in the first place: the link between the nature 
of a criminal act X (the ‘desert basis’) and a fitting sanction Y is insufficiently direct in such 
cases. I define a new, much narrower account of the kind of criminal wrongdoing which is a 
more plausible desert basis for disenfranchisement: ‘political wrongdoing’, such as 
electioneering, corruption, or conspiracy with foreign powers. I conclude that widespread 
blanket and post-incarceration disenfranchisement policies are overinclusive, because they 
disenfranchise persons guilty of serious, but non-political, criminal wrongdoing. While such 
overinclusiveness is objectionable in any context, it is particularly objectionable in 
circumstances in which it has additional large-scale collateral consequences, for instance by 
perpetuating existing structures of racial injustice. At the same time, current policies are 
underinclusive, thus hindering the aim of holding political wrongdoers accountable.	  	  
	   	  	  
Philosophy & Public Affairs (Early View, 2019). This is the accepted version. Please cite the 
published version (https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12153). 
 
   Over one in five African American citizens in Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
Virginia are currently disenfranchised due to a present or past felony conviction.2 6.1 
million US citizens were disenfranchised as of November 2016, although 1.4 million 
citizens became re-eligible to vote again on January 8th, 2019, when Florida’s constitutional 
amendment 4 (Voting Rights Restoration for Felons Initiative) came into effect. Irrespective 
of these recent changes, however, the lasting political impact of criminal 
disenfranchisement remains significant, particularly in the US, where many states 
disenfranchise not only those currently serving prison time, but also parolees and ex-
convicts. Studies argue that even if the US had enfranchised only those felons who already 
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served their time in prison, Democrats might have controlled the Senate throughout the 
1990s, and that the outcomes of several presidential elections—most notably in 2000—might 
have been different.3 More importantly, when blanket disenfranchisement policies are 
implemented in a wider empirical context of mass incarceration with salient disparate 
consequences for oppressed minorities, they risk further entrenching, and indeed 
exacerbating, conditions of structural racial injustice.   
  But even if the number of people at risk of long-term democratic exclusion is lower 
in a given polity than it is in the US, criminal disenfranchisement raises difficult questions 
for democratic theory. The UK, where the prison population is much smaller,4 and thus, 
the number of disenfranchised prisoners is much lower, imposed a blanket 
disenfranchisement policy for all prisoners until the end of 2017. This number will be even 
lower going forward, since the UK government has recently, after a twelve year standoff, 
decided to change its policy to comply with a 2005 European Court of Human Rights 
judgment in the landmark case Hirst v. UK, which stated that the UK’s blanket ban violated 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.5 Currently, the blanket ban continues to apply to 
all prisoners in principle, with a few exceptions: for those released on temporary licence or 
on home detention, those on remand, and those committed to prison for contempt of court 
or for default on paying fines.6 Yet it would be incorrect to infer that the practice is less 
objectionable given the comparatively smaller number of disenfranchised criminals, 
especially since the racially disparate, and thus structurally unjust, impact of 
disenfranchisement also applies to the UK.7 
 The view that temporary disenfranchisement, contemporaneous with an offender’s 
term of incarceration, is much less morally troubling than post-incarceration or permanent 
disenfranchisement is widespread. While it is plausible to think that, in general, temporary 
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punishments of type P are less severe than permanent punishments of the same type P, this 
general claim by itself does not have a clear necessary upshot for the issue at stake in this 
paper: whether criminal disenfranchisement, including in its temporary form, is morally 
permissible all things considered. The severity of a punishment is one obviously relevant 
consideration for determining whether imposing that punishment is morally permissible, 
since some severe punishments may be unduly burdensome for the criminal offender; but 
it not the only consideration: a plausible theory of punishment must also identify the proper 
positive normative justification for imposing punishment in the first place, such as the 
nature of the criminal act at stake and the associated benefits or aptness of a given punitive 
sanction. While such positive justifications underpinning views defending temporary 
disenfranchisement on deterrentist, expressivist, and positive retributivist grounds are more 
plausible prima facie than their respective counterparts demanding post-incarceration and 
permanent criminal disenfranchisement, we must still assess each positive justification’s 
merits in turn. I argue that we have strong reasons to reject each of these views in favour of 
a different, more restricted view.     
  I define the set of rights that can be temporarily forfeited during criminal 
disenfranchisement as the full set of democratic participation rights—including, for instance, 
the right to vote, the right to run for office in a given election and to continue to hold public 
office once elected, or the right to contribute financially to political campaigns, but 
excluding the more general, higher-order right to free expression.8 This is a broader view 
of criminal disenfranchisement than the majority of contributors to the philosophical 
debate have adopted, many of whom focus exclusively on the right to vote, thus failing to 
consider other forms of (dis-)enfranchisement. Even if a criminal retains her right to vote, 
revoking other participation rights is a possible punishment, and in that case, it would be 
counterintuitive to say that she continues to be fully enfranchised. Her set of participation 
opportunities in democratic decision-making has been punitively limited. Therefore, 
criminal disenfranchisement is best construed as a broader notion, accommodating the 
intuition that disenfranchisement can be a matter of degree.  
 This paper approaches criminal disenfranchisement from the view that there is a 
prima facie presumption in favour of universal suffrage, which implies an especially high 
justificatory threshold for any deviation from that presumption. As the ECtHR ruling in 
Hirst v. UK put it, “[a]ny departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks 
undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws which it 
promulgates” (§62). The value of political inclusion is particularly high because the 
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realization of that value via universal suffrage is important for securing other important 
values and rights in a democratic state, including individual liberty rights.9 This is an 
instrumentalist justification of the value of political inclusion: given political realities of 
unequal power, protecting the equal liberty of democratic citizens will depend in part on 
every citizen’s ability to publicly exercise partial but meaningful democratic control over 
how individual rights and liberties are protected within a democratic state: democratic 
participation rights tend to be protectors of other rights. Thus, while punishments not 
involving disenfranchisement—such as incarceration—may well be considered morally 
troubling on the grounds that they limit individual liberty rights, they are less morally 
troubling than disenfranchisement in that limits on universal democratic participation rights 
prevent those who are temporarily or permanently excluded from democratically 
contesting the ways in which democratic states may permissibly limit their liberty rights, and 
the liberty rights of others.10 The presumption in favour of universal suffrage thus suggests 
that disenfranchisement as a deviation from an important norm merits particularly careful 
normative justification, especially in light of our historical experience with widespread 
unjust types of disenfranchisement, such as the exclusion of women, persons of color, and 
members of the working class. Rather than thinking of full positive enfranchisement as 
conditional on certain standards being met, we should therefore think of 
disenfranchisement as an exception permissible only on the condition that particularly 
stringent justificatory standards are met. 
  If one agrees that there is a prima facie presumption in favour of universal suffrage, 
one must also agree that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of those wishing to 
deny the vote to a particular person to show why, if ever, criminal disenfranchisement is 
justifiable in a specific case. I begin by outlining deterrence-based and expressivist 
justifications of criminal disenfranchisement, and showing why such justifications fail. 
Another historically popular justification of criminal disenfranchisement is the positive 
retributivist view that disenfranchisement is a fitting response for a wide range of serious 
crimes, such as murder or assault. I argue that positive retributivism ultimately fails to 
provide persuasive justifications for defining the desert basis for disenfranchisement as 
broadly as it currently is. While positive retributivists are right that fittingness matters for 
                                                                                                                
9 This does not imply that in a state in which anyone is disenfranchised, no-one’s liberty is secured: rather, 
departures from the presumption in favour of political inclusion warrant especially careful justification so as 
not to endanger the equal liberty of democratic citizens. 
10 Of course, given that other forms of punishment like incarceration pose significant burdens on individual 
liberty, they may not be defensible in their current form either. Much like there is a presumption in favour 
of universal suffrage, there is a presumption in favour of ending mass incarceration. So while there is a special 
presumption against disenfranchisement, it is not obvious that there is no presumption against other forms of 
punishment like incarceration. 
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justifiable punishment, it does not follow that disenfranchisement is a punishment which 
plausibly fits all serious crimes. Furthermore, a purely retributivist account relying solely on 
a desert-based fittingness argument is an insufficient positive justification for why we ought 
to disenfranchise particular criminals: given the special moral weight of the democratic 
presumption in favour of universal suffrage, and the morally costly consequences of 
disenfranchisement, a supplementary positive argument—compatible with the original 
presumption—is required. In other words, desert is necessary, but not sufficient for 
justifying disenfranchisement. Building on structurally similar negative retributivist 
contributions to the philosophy of punishment, I develop a negative retributivist account of 
disenfranchisement, combining a novel conceptual account of the appropriate desert basis 
for disenfranchisement with a positive instrumentalist justifiability condition. I argue the 
relevant kinds of wrongs for disenfranchisement are political wrongs, a very narrow subset 
of the set of public wrongs (i.e. crimes). Since no contributor to this debate has done so 
thus far, I give a systematic account of political wrongdoing. I then show why only political 
wrongdoers temporarily forfeit their right not to be punished via disenfranchisement, and 
why disenfranchising political wrongdoers fulfils both the negative retributivist desert 
criterion and the instrumentalist justifiability condition, according to which 
disenfranchisement is justified if and because it deters and temporarily incapacitates 
political wrongdoers, which in turn ultimately helps to protect and enforce the presumption 
in favour of universal suffrage of all democratic subjects as equals.    
 
I.   The Non-Retributivist Case for Criminal Disenfranchisement,  
  and Why It Fails  
  Constitutional and criminal law scholars have cast significant doubt on the notion 
that criminal disenfranchisement is justifiable given existing laws and constitutional 
provisions. In the US, criminal disenfranchisement has been subject to scrutiny11 because 
of its possible violation of the 14th amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,12 the 8th 
amendment’s ban of cruel and unusual punishment, and various laws prohibiting 
disenfranchisement on racial grounds, such as the 15th amendment and the US Voting 
                                                                                                                
11 The relevant body of scholarship has far earlier origins than one might expect: for instance, several 
contributions to the very first issue of the APSR (1906) considered the role of racially motivated 
discriminatory intent for criminal disenfranchisement policies. See e.g. John C. Rose, “Negro Suffrage: The 
Constitutional Point of View,” American Political Science Review 1 (1906): 17-43. 
12 Legal scholarship in this area has mainly reacted to the US Supreme Court’s ruling in the landmark case 
Richardson v. Ramirez 418 U.S. 24 (1974), which stated that felon disenfranchisement does not violate the 
14th amendment if voting restrictions are necessary due to a “compelling state interest”. For an influential 
critique, see Karlan, “Convictions and Doubts,” 1147-70.  
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Rights Act (1965). While clashes between empirical practices of disenfranchisement and 
contemporary legal provisions do carry moral significance, they do not decisively settle the 
normative question of which theory of punishment can plausibly justify criminal 
disenfranchisement, irrespective of current empirical practices. Here, I discuss possible 
normative justifications of criminal disenfranchisement based on dominant theories of 
punishment in general: deterrence accounts, expressivist accounts, and—in a separate 
section—retributivist accounts. 
 
1.   Deterrence Accounts and the Problem of Democratic Incentives 
  Deterrence theories of punishment claim that punishment is justified only if it 
reduces the likelihood of potential offenders actually offending.13 The point of punishment, 
then, is forward-looking crime reduction. To justify criminal disenfranchisement, 
deterrence theorists must show that it will in fact serve these aims. In principle, deterrence 
views are compatible with punishing the innocent, and with disproportionately punishing 
the guilty.14 But deterrence theorists can respond to this problem by arguing that well-
functioning democratic societies have protections against unjust punishments.15 While this 
response may be persuasive with respect to constructing a deterrence justification of 
punishment in general, it fails in the specific context of justifying criminal 
disenfranchisement. Why is this so? 
No Incentives Objection: According to the deterrence theorist, protections 
from unjust punishment rely on interventions by elected public officials. If 
democratic states disenfranchise some incarcerated members (including 
some innocent ones), those members cannot appeal their own 
disenfranchisement, or lobby for protections against unjust punishment. 
Elected officials have no incentive to consider the interests of the unjustly 
punished in having protections against unjust punishment, since the latter 
will not be able to penalise them at the ballot box anyway. This applies even 
to cases of temporary disenfranchisement, if the term of incarceration with 
which disenfranchisement is contemporaneous coincides with federal, state, 
                                                                                                                
13 Examples of recent accounts of deterrence theory include Anthony Ellis, “A Deterrence Theory of 
Punishment,” Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 337-51; Zachary Hoskins, “Deterrent Punishment and 
Respect for Persons,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 8 (2011): 369-84; Victor Tadros, The Ends of 
Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
14 David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 41-52; Igor 
Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989), 33-72; William D. 
Ross, The Right and The Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 56-64. 
15 For similar arguments, see John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” The Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 3-
32; John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also 
Tadros, The Ends of Harm, 42, stating explicitly that one of the central strengths of his constrained deterrence 
account is its ostensible ability to avoid punishing the innocent. But see Patrick Tomlin, “Innocence Lost: A 
Problem for Punishment as Duty,” Law and Philosophy 36 (2017): 225-54 for an argument (which succeeds, 




and local elections as well as with other opportunities to exercise democratic 
participation rights. 
Deterrence theorists may respond that other members of the democratic state—the 
enfranchised—can pressure elected officials to create and uphold protections against unjust 
punishments. Doing so would be in their self-interest, given that they themselves may be 
unjustly disenfranchised in the future. However, this response tells us nothing about why 
unjust punishments are morally permissible. Instead, it simply acknowledges that unjust 
punishments are a moral problem, and then states that it is possible (though not certain) to 
rectify the problem during the democratic process. A theory of punishment that excludes 
the possibility of punishing the innocent from the start would be more appealing. But such 
a theory cannot be a pure deterrence theory, for it would have to introduce additional 
principles justifying why unjust punishment is intrinsically wrong in all cases. This kind of 
judgment is not possible if a theory of punishment makes the justification for criminal 
disenfranchisement contingent on its context-dependent effects, and not on the context-
independent wrongness of punishing innocents. 
 
2.  Expressivism and the Problem of Self-Contradiction 
  The possession of voting rights and other democratic participation rights carries 
symbolic significance. As Bennett and Viehoff put it, 
  [t]he democratic presumption in favour of enfranchisement reflects [a] non- 
  outcome-related […] value […]. The right to vote […] identifies its bearer as  
  someone who counts. […B]y enfranchising someone we publicly affirm that  
  her interests are worthy of the protection that the right to vote provides.16  
Even if disenfranchisement’s effect on morally weighty interests is trivial, it may constitute 
a non-trivial communicative wrong against the rights-holder. But those who endorse 
expressivist justifications of criminal disenfranchisement17 may insist that the expressivist 
wrong truly at stake goes in the opposite direction: enfranchising criminals communicates 
disrespect to the law-abiding demos members. Therefore, disenfranchising criminals is 
justified because it expresses a democratic polity’s commitment to its own laws.18  
                                                                                                                
16 Christopher Bennett and Daniel Viehoff, “Written evidence for the UK’s Joint Committee on the draft 
Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill,” https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/Draft-Voting-
Eligibility-Prisoners-Bill/prisonervoting-evidvol%20(4).pdf, 97 [my emphases]. 
17 For expressivist views, see Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” The Monist 49 (1965): 
397-423. For other versions of expressivism (also known as ‘communicative theories of punishment’) see 
Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 148 (2000): 1503-75; R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and 
Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
18 For a critical account, see López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement, 116-7. 
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 However—first—criminal disenfranchisement is not necessary to achieve expressivist 
aims: we can communicate our disapproval of criminal behaviour in other ways which do 
not involve the infringement of key political rights, for instance, during sentencing. Other 
kinds of punishment, like incarceration, can express the same message. Expressivists would 
have to rely on additional criteria to show why criminal disenfranchisement in particular—
as opposed to other kinds of punishment—is necessary for communicating disapproval. 
Second, criminal disenfranchisement is not sufficient for achieving expressivist aims in all 
cases. After all, the expressivist message may get ‘lost in translation’—for instance, in 
societies facing pervasive disagreement about the justness of existing laws, and the duty to 
expressively affirm them as a collective. If an offender does not (want to) understand the 
expressivist message, this poses a problem for expressivism, unless expressivists can show 
that affirming democratic values specifically by disenfranchising criminals has intrinsic 
value.19  
  Expressivists may respond that they need neither claim that disenfranchisement is 
necessary nor that it is sufficient, but that disenfranchisement is simply an appropriate way 
of expressing the expectation that full participation rights are conditional on respecting 
other citizens’ rights. Temporary criminal disenfranchisement, much like temporary 
incarceration, would then simply be part of a punitive package with one expressivist 
purpose: communicating the insistence that this standard be met.20 The Standards View is 
a declarative account of expressivism, rather than an instructive one geared towards the 
moral education of criminals.21 But we cannot consider the illocutionary act of declaring 
standards for enfranchisement in isolation from its perlocutionary effects in a given social 
context. Grant that democratic states have a right to engage in the illocutionary act of 
declaring standards, and that one such standard is non-criminality. This stronger version of 
expressivism is not vulnerable to the objections above, and thus seems intuitively plausible 
under (near-)ideal circumstances. However, in a non-ideal world, disenfranchisement as a 
response to the failure to meet such standards involves expressing condemnation, and thus 
stigmatising, criminal offenders in a way that often disproportionately affects persons of 
                                                                                                                
19 One might think that it ultimately does not matter whether the offender understands the expressivist 
message, since the real addressee is the polity as a whole. However, analogous problems arise: if significant 
disagreement persists in society about the justness of particular laws and punishments, the purpose and 
content of the expressivist message may be lost on a large part of the democratic constituency.  
20 Andrew Altman proposes a similar view in “Democratic Self-Determination and the Disenfranchisement 
of Felons,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2005): 265. Note that Altman’s view does not suggest that 
criminal disenfranchisement as an insistence on certain standards being met is morally required, nor does it 
suggest that criminal disenfranchisement is necessarily a matter of punishment. Instead, Altman’s view is that 
disenfranchisement is merely a morally permissible decision for democratic constituencies to make given 
their right of self-determination. 
21 This terminology relies on Andrei Poama and Tom Theuns, “Making Offenders Vote: Democratic 
Expressivism and Compulsory Criminal Voting,” American Political Science Review 113 (2019): 796–809. 
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colour. In the specific non-ideal context of the contemporary US, this ‘badge of dishonor’ 
has a distinctive historical connotation tied to the Jim Crow era. Given this, 
disenfranchisement with racially disproportionate effects constitutes a culturally and socially 
specific expressive harm.22 For expressivists, this should count as an overriding normative 
reason, on expressivist grounds, not to disenfranchise criminals, because it would be 
morally repugnant to insist on exercising a declarative, standard-setting right if doing so 
leads to the imposition of severe, unequally distributed expressive harms. 
 Expressivists may make another claim about disenfranchisement: rather than 
simply expressing a demos’s judgment, it may serve the aim of morally educating or 
motivating criminals to abide by a polity’s laws. Sigler claims that criminal 
disenfranchisement may “heighten offenders’ sense of civic responsibility by establishing 
the expectation of restored political participation”,23 and Hampton states that “the 
suspension of voting rights [may] change […] the wrongdoers’ way of thinking about himself 
and society”.24 Even if an offender does not want to receive the expressivist message of 
disapproval, expressivists hope that temporarily losing participation rights will promote an 
offender’s civic virtue. Yet aside from the fact that this claim is implausibly speculative about 
the actual empirical consequences of disenfranchisement, it reveals a deeper normative 
tension. On the one hand, expressivists are committed to the view that the collective 
exercise of democratic participation rights educates people, and instils civic virtue in them 
because participation constitutes an expressive re-affirmation of democratic values.25 On the 
other hand, by endorsing disenfranchisement, expressivists seem to assume that it is exactly 
the deprivation of participation rights that instils civic virtue in the demos’s members. 
Which is it? Given these internal tensions, we should reject the expressivist justification of 
criminal disenfranchisement. In fact, the expressivist case for enfranchising criminals is 
                                                                                                                
22 It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a complete conceptual account of expressive harms of this 
kind. For further discussion see Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi, “Expressive Harms, ‘Bizarre Districts,’ 
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno,” Michigan Law Review 92 
(1993): 483–587. 
23 Mary Sigler, “Defensible Disenfranchisement,” Iowa Law Review 99 (2014): 1728. 
24 Jean Hampton, “Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A Case Study in the Expressive Meaning of 
the Law,” The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 11 (1998): 43. 
25 Jean Hampton, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984): 40-
44. This expressivist commitment coheres with the presumption in favour of universal suffrage, and thus with 
the view that political inclusion has an especially high value in comparison to other important values in a 
democratic state, such as individual liberty rights. Given this, expressivists can coherently defend incarceration 
while rejecting disenfranchisement: the internal tension in the expressivist justification of disenfranchisement 
does not arise in the same way for expressivist justifications of incarceration without disenfranchisement, since 
expressivists can plausibly argue that temporary incarceration fulfils the expressivist aim of instilling civic virtue 
in offenders while at the same time allowing offenders to expressively reaffirm their own commitment to 
democratic values by exercising participation rights. By not disenfranchising incarcerated criminals, 
democratic states can publicly express their commitment to the value of citizens’ equal liberty. 
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stronger than for disenfranchising them, if doing so would allow criminals to join the rest 
of the demos members in expressing their commitment to democratic values. 
 
II.  The Retributivist Challenge 
1.  Positive Retributivism and the Fittingness Problem 
  Positive (or ‘pure’) retributivists are committed to two basic assumptions: the guilty 
deserve to be punished in a way that fits their crime in a proportionate way, and no moral 
consideration relevant to punishment outweighs the offender’s criminal desert.26  
  Positive retributivists face the difficult problem of identifying what it is about an act 
of criminal wrongdoing that makes disenfranchisement proportionate, to explain why the 
criminal deserves disenfranchisement instead of, or in addition to, other available punitive 
sanctions like incarceration. The ECtHR ruling in Hirst v. UK discusses this problem 
explicitly: “the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between 
the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned”.27  
  One way of justifying why criminal disenfranchisement is a fitting response to 
criminal wrongdoing is to argue that criminals have, by breaking the law, shown that they 
are morally—though not necessarily rationally—unfit to participate politically. In the US 
context, the most influential statement of the moral fitness view which is still often invoked 
today is the 1884 ruling of the Alabama Supreme Court in Washington v. Alabama, 
according to which the aim of disenfranchisement is to   
  preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the only sure foundation of  
  republican liberty […] one rendered infamous by conviction of felony […] is  
  unfit for the privilege of suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of equality  
  with freemen who are clothed by the State with the toga of political  
  citizenship.28 
Contemporary versions of this argument rely on the intuition that committing a serious 
criminal offence is sufficient for showing that a criminal is morally unfit to participate 
politically in society. If a person wilfully or recklessly breaks democratically made laws, the 
intuition goes, it is fitting to (temporarily or permanently) revoke her right to participate in 
                                                                                                                
26 Michael S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution,” in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: 
New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. Ferdinand D. Schoeman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), 179-219; Morris, “Persons and Punishment”, 475-501; Andrew von Hirsch, Doing  Justice: The 
Choice of Punishments (New York: Hill & Wang, 1976). Not all positive retributivists are desert theorists, 
but I focus on this dominant type of positive retributivism here. 
27 Hirst v. UK, §71. 
28 Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) [emphases added]. 
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the democratic making of laws.29 Even if her primary intention was not to express disregard 
for the value of democratically made laws, she has in effect acted out of disregard for that 
value. On this view, a criminal deserves temporary suspension from participating as a co-
deliberator because of her failure to willingly subject herself to the rules for regulating 
society. Importantly, what motivates this version of the fittingness intuition is not the severity 
of harm inflicted by perpetrators of criminal wrongdoing, such as the harm inflicted by 
murder or assault, but the wrong of breaking a law that has been democratically agreed 
upon: criminal disenfranchisement is fitting, on this view, not primarily because the crime 
in question is particularly morally serious and because disenfranchisement is a weighty 
punitive sanction on par with the crime’s seriousness, but because disenfranchisement 
temporarily deprives the criminal of opportunities to co-author the system of laws contrary 
to which she has acted, and thus of opportunities to exercise power, to some extent, over 
what other members of society may (not) do.  
  But it is not obvious why we should accept this claim. First, not all criminal 
wrongdoing is morally objectionable to an extent that sufficiently demonstrates a moral 
unfitness to participate in all democratic decisions during the duration of their punishment, 
rather than a specific instance (if at all) of moral wrongdoing: consider, for instance, petty 
theft out of necessity. But even in cases of morally serious criminal wrongdoing, such as 
murder, it is unclear how the fact that a criminal has violated one democratically made law 
substantiates the view that the criminal has in effect acted in disregard of all democratically 
made laws. A murderer, for instance, might genuinely believe in the rule of law’s legitimacy 
as a whole, and adhere to all laws unrelated to murder. By this, I do not mean to suggest 
that criminal wrongdoing like murder is not morally serious. But acting out of disregard for 
one democratically made law and acting out of disregard for all democratic laws is 
qualitatively different: we cannot necessarily infer the latter from the former. Intuitions 
about fittingness (and thus, desert) must be informed in part by our moral judgments about 
how close the fittingness link between desert basis and desert object must be. This judgment 
will depend on which specific underlying values are at stake in light of the imposition of 
desert-based punishment. In the case of disenfranchisement, this would be the value of 
political inclusion in accordance with the presumption in favour of universal suffrage, 
which—as I have argued—is particularly high for instrumental reasons: its full realisation is 
important for the protection of other central democratic values, such as the equal liberty of 
citizens realised through the joint exercise of democratic control. Thus, the justificatory 
                                                                                                                
29 This is commonly taken to imply that positive retributivism points towards a broadly defined desert basis 
for criminal disenfranchisement, which extends to all perpetrators of serious criminal wrongdoing. 
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burden for disenfranchisement is both very high and very specific, which is why it is not 
surprising that only a smaller group of criminals will meet this justificatory threshold, in 
comparison to the group of criminals who deserve punishments like fines and 
incarceration. Morally serious crimes, which are not primarily wrong because they 
undermine others’s ability to meaningfully exercise democratic control within robust 
democratic institutions, provide an insufficiently close desert basis for disenfranchisement, 
given the particularly high value at stake. 
Second, to contrast, consider a person who never commits any crimes, but 
nevertheless holds a disregard for the system of democratically made laws. She might not 
violate existing laws, but from her perspective, the legitimacy of democratically made laws 
may not constitute a reason for her to act in a certain way. Thus the moral fitness argument 
does not succeed in plausibly capturing the cases it is trying to capture, and it is both under- 
and overinclusive because the cases it does capture are the wrong cases.  
  Some positive retributivists combine the moral fitness argument with a claim about 
fairness: as Herbert Morris argues, “[i]f a person fails to exercise self-restraint even though 
he might have […] he renounces a burden which others have voluntarily assumed and thus 
gains an advantage which others, who have restrained themselves, do not possess”,30 in 
which case it would be unfair not to punish the criminal. The combined argument from 
moral fitness and fairness assumes that all criminals derive benefits from lawbreaking. The 
relevant ‘advantage’ would be the fact that the criminal has allowed herself to commit a 
crime, usually (though not always) for self-interested reasons, which other demos members 
have—on this basis—restrained themselves from committing. If demos members have 
collectively agreed to restrain themselves, the argument goes, it would be unfair of criminals 
to renege on this democratic agreement. 
   However, the notion that criminals derive unfair advantages from criminal 
wrongdoing, and that this justifies the imposition of punishment—such as criminal 
disenfranchisement—faces serious problems: not all crimes lead to unfair net benefits for 
the criminal, and while many crimes are committed with the specific intent of deriving 
benefits, not all of them—including morally serious ones—are, for instance those involving 
ignorance or negligence. While the sentence in those latter cases may be more lenient, the 
offence may still be serious enough to result in a conviction that in practice triggers 
disenfranchisement.  
                                                                                                                
30 Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” 477. 
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 But more importantly, I doubt that the fairness argument helps justify criminal 
disenfranchisement in the way that positive retributivists might think.31 Criminal 
disenfranchisement comes with the significant democratic cost of making it impossible for 
prisoners to have a say in how democratic decisions affect their interests—not only general 
democratic decisions, but also specific decisions affecting them more directly, such as the 
use of public funds towards improving prison conditions.32 Furthermore, 
disenfranchisement itself seems unfair especially in cases where persons reasonably 
disagree about the criminal law’s content and scope. If what constitutes a crime, and why, 
is subject to democratic debate, then democratic societies must be particularly careful about 
depriving lawbreakers of opportunites to voice disagreement.33 Contrary to Morris’s view, 
blanket disenfranchisement—even if temporary—thus seems intuitively unfair, not 
enfranchisement. By contrast, incarceration (without simultaneous disenfranchisement) is 
not unfair in the same way, since it would still allow incarcerated criminals to engage in 
democratic deliberations about the status of (non-) criminal acts subject to reasonable 
disagreement. Importantly, the distinct perspective of currently and previously incarcerated 
individuals, which likely differs from the perspectives of non-incarcerated citizens, may 
enrich such deliberations. Ultimately, positive retributivism fails to articulate a plausibly 
constrained desert basis for disenfranchisement. 
2.   The Negative Retributivist Alternative 
  Negative retributivists like myself reject the standard (‘positive’, or ‘pure’) 
retributivist view that desert provides a sufficient positive reason to punish the guilty.34 
Instead, negative retributivism imposes constraints on a particular justification of 
punishment (in this case, criminal disenfranchisement): we should disenfranchise only 
those criminals who deserve it, and only in proportion with their respective desert.35 
Negative retributivism thus articulates the lack of a desert basis: when have persons not 
                                                                                                                
31 A commitment to fairness as a side constraint for punishment does, however, help determine the correct 
scope of disenfranchisement once it has been justified—see Part IV. 
32 On this point see Kleinig and Murtagh, “Disenfranchising Felons,” 229. 
33 Obviously, some crimes are uncontroversially morally wrongful, such as murder. But the point still holds 
that when the morally wrongfulness of some crimes is controversial, we have strong fairness-based reasons to 
be cautious about disenfranchisement, given that disenfranchisement would prevent the participation of a 
subset of people in democratic deliberations concerning the wrongfulness of controversially morally wrongful 
crimes.  
34 John D. Mabbott, “Punishment,” Mind 48 (1939): 150-67; Anthony M. Quinton, “On Punishment,” 
Analysis 14 (1954): 133-42; Richard L. Lippke, “Some Surprising Implications of Negative Retributivism,” 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2014): 49-62. 
35 For a classic definition of negative retributivism see J. L. Mackie, “Retributivism: A test case for ethical 
objectivity,” reprinted in Philosophy of Law, eds. Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross, fourth edition (Belmont 
CA: Wadsworth, 1991), 677-84. See also Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community, 11-12. 
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temporarily forfeited their right not to be punished via criminal disenfranchisement? Of 
course, this does not by itself amount to a full positive justification of why, and when, 
criminal disenfranchisement is justified.36 Therefore, negative retributivism must be 
supplemented by additional, non-retributivist principles, which can accomplish this 
normative task. This, however, is a strength of the account, not a weakness. Unlike positive 
retributivism, negative retributivism can incorporate plausible forward-looking 
instrumentalist concerns—such as deterrence, but also incapacitation, or more specifically, 
the concern for the integrity of the democratic procedures and institutions enabling the 
protection and enforcement of the rights of democratic citizens in the first place.37 At the 
same time, negative retributivism remains immune to my earlier objections to pure 
deterrence accounts, as negative retributivism is incompatible with punishing the innocent. 
Similarly, negative retributivism is not internally contradictory like pure expressivist 
justifications of disenfranchisement, though it can accommodate supplementary 
expressivist considerations when it comes to providing a positive justification of 
disenfranchisement. Furthermore, negative retributivism is compatible with side constraints 
introduced specifically to ensure coherence with the higher-order moral concern of 
protecting the integrity of democratic procedures and institutions, which will be specified 
later. 
  But what exactly would a plausible mixed justification for criminal 
disenfranchisement built on negative retributivist foundations look like? In my view, it must 
proceed from two claims: 
1.   Desert as a necessary but not sufficient condition (Negative 
Retributivism): Deserving punishment is a necessary condition for its 
overall justification. Those (and only those) guilty of wrongdoing of type 
X deserve to be punished in proportion to their desert. 
2.   Compatibility Claim: Criminal disenfranchisement is compatible with 
the presumption in favour of universal suffrage and the higher-order 
moral goal of the equal protection of the democratic rights of citizens, 
provided that (i) it adheres to sentencing constraints38 which do not 
undermine that goal, and that (ii) it disenfranchises only those members 
of X who deserve disenfranchisement specifically, not simply 
punishment in general. 
                                                                                                                
36 For a similar point, see Richard L. Lippke, “Criminal Offenders and Right Forfeiture,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy 32 (2001): 78. 
37 This does not mean that I endorse a complete instrumentalist account of punishment, such as standard 
deterrence theory, which I have rejected above. But I do endorse plausible aspects of that theory but not the 
view that it is sometimes morally justifiable to punish the innocent, and to disproportionately punish the guilty.  
38 These constraints will be specified below. 
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In what follows, I develop this argument by distinguishing between different types of 
criminal wrongdoing, and arguing that a special, narrowly defined type of crime is a more 
plausible desert basis for disenfranchisement: political wrongdoing. I show why negative 
retributivism justifies the criminal disenfranchisement of political wrongdoers—and political 
wrongdoers only. 
III.  Rethinking the Desert Basis: Political Wrongdoing 
1.  What is Political Wrongdoing? 
a.  Crimes as Public Wrongs: Not All Public Wrongs Are Created Equal 
  Contemporary practices of criminal disenfranchisement in the UK, the US, and 
many other states operate on the assumption that the relevant kind of wrongdoing for which 
we may justifiably disenfranchise offenders is the set of serious crimes (or ‘felonies’) that 
also justify incarceration. This includes, most obviously, standard mala in se crimes like 
murder, but also mala prohibita like the illegal use of (some) drugs. Why disenfranchise 
such a wide set of criminals? A closer inspection of what crimes are is insightful here. As 
Duff and others have argued, what distinguishes crimes of the kind mentioned above from 
other kinds of wrongdoing (e.g. torts) is that they are public wrongs: “[w]rongs done to 
individual members of the community are then wrongs against the whole community […] 
insofar as the individual goods which are attacked are goods in terms of which the 
community identifies and understands itself”.39 This makes crime everybody’s business.40 
Public wrongs thus necessarily affect the interests of every member of a democratic polity. 
However, it would be too quick to infer from this conceptual point that the kinds of 
wrongdoing warranting criminal disenfranchisement simply are crimes, i.e. the full set of 
public wrongs. Why?  
While I do not wish to reject the widely shared view that crimes are public wrongs, 
I do not think that all public wrongs are primarily wrong because they wrong the public. To 
see the force of this intuition, contrast the following two cases: 
                                                                                                                
39 Sandra E. Marshall and R. A. Duff, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs,” The Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 11 (1998): 20. 
40 For a direct statement of this point, see R. A. Duff, “Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law,” in 
Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, eds. R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 139: “Public wrongs are our wrongs as citizens—wrongs in which we take a proper interest, to 
which we should collectively respond, for which we claim the right […] to call the perpetrator to answer to us. 
Some such wrongs are public in their material impact: if we ask who is wronged the answer is ‘the public’; this 
is true of, for instance, […] wrongs that threaten public institutions; of frauds committed against the public 
purse. Others take individuals as their direct victims, but count as ‘our’ wrongs because they violate our public 
values, and because we share them with the victim: our concern for the victim as our fellow citizen makes 
them our business.” [emphases added] 
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Jane the Murderer: Jane murders Gary. Her only reason for murdering  
  Gary is her personal feeling of hatred towards him. Jane is not trying to make  
  a public statement by murdering Gary—in fact, she will try everything  
  possible to avoid becoming a publicly known suspect in the subsequent  
  investigation.  
By committing the murder, Jane has not only wronged Gary as an individual, but also the 
public. But this is not the primary reason why it was wrong for Jane to murder Gary. Murder 
is in and of itself morally wrong (hence, malum in se). Arguably, this is the more obvious 
reason why we call murder a wrongful act. The additional wrong towards the public is 
secondary to this initial wrong. The public’s interest in punishing murderers is an interest 
on behalf of murder victims: murders are “[public] wrongs that the victim ought to pursue—
that it would be wrong to shrug off or ignore”.41 Contrast Jane the Murderer to 
Jane’s Get Out of Jail Free Card: Jane is a suspect in the investigation of  
  Gary’s murder. The prosecutor in Jane’s case, Mary, knows about Jane’s  
  crime. Jane knows that Mary knows. Jane bribes Mary to lie in court to  
  protect Jane, so that Jane will not be convicted of murder. Mary accepts the  
  bribe. Jane does not get convicted for murdering Gary. 
Both public wrongs here differ significantly from the public wrong in Jane the Murderer. 
First, Jane’s criminal wrongdoing (bribery of a public official for private gain) is wrong 
primarily because it obstructs justice, thereby undermining vital features of well-functioning 
democratic institutions: it is primarily wrong because it wrongs the public, and thus differs 
in this respect from Jane’s initial wrongdoing (murder). Second, Mary has committed a 
cluster of public wrongs (accepting bribes, obstruction of justice, being derelict in her special 
obligations as a public official), and again, these wrongs are primarily directed at the public. 
Obviously, Mary has also wronged particular individuals: Gary’s relatives perhaps, who 
have an interest in justice being served. But having wronged Gary’s relatives individually is 
arguably not the main reason why Mary’s actions were wrongful, as her actions as a public 
official have larger-scale implications. Mary, by accepting the bribe, would have still 
wronged the public even if Jane had been convicted despite Mary’s lies, such that justice 
would have been served.  
  Contrasting Jane the Murderer and Jane’s Get Out of Jail Free Card gives us strong 
reasons to differentiate between different kinds of public wrongs. If only some public 
wrongs are primarily wrong because they wrong the public, we must ask what exactly defines 
                                                                                                                
41 Sandra E. Marshall and R. A. Duff, “Public and Private Wrongs,” in Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of 
Sir Gerald Gordon, eds. James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick, and Lindsay Farmer,  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010), 83. 
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that subset of cases—and whether negative retributivism supports disenfranchising those 
who commit any or all types of public wrongs.   
b.  Defining Political Wrongs 
  I define political wrongdoing as the subset of public wrongs which are primarily 
wrong because they wrong the public by (i) wrongfully imposing a non-trivial risk of harm 
on the integrity of democratic institutions or procedures, and (ii) by committing such wrongs 
with a wrongful intention which makes a modal difference for the potential harm caused 
(not necessarily by the political wrongdoer herself) should the risk eventuate. Here, 
wrongful risks of harm (i) and wrongful intentions (ii) are necessary elements of a sufficient 
set (NESS),42 where (i) and (ii) are jointly sufficient for a public wrong to count as political 
wrongdoing. 
 
Risks of Harm 
  I say ‘wrongfully imposing a non-trivial risk’ because I endorse the view that some 
risk impositions can be wrongful even if the harm never eventuates, provided that the risk 
of harm’s probability and severity is non-trivial.43 Including ‘risks of harm’, rather than 
‘actual harm’ only, is particularly important because public wrongs also include inchoate 
offences, such as attempts to rig elections, to obstruct justice, or to silence or otherwise 
harm political opponents. Consider 
  Jane’s Permanent Get Out of Jail Free Card: Jane is plotting future murders.  
  Jane hires a helper for the specific purpose of bribing any public official— 
  not just Mary—involved in any future criminal prosecutions of Jane’s crimes.  
  Jane has not committed her second murder yet, but she has created a system  
  that increases her chances of successfully obstructing justice. The presence  
  of this system itself constitutes a non-trivial risk of harm to the integrity of  
  democratic procedures and institutions in Jane’s state. 
To clarify, this example also applies to failed attempts. When Jane commits her second 
murder, Jane’s helper’s bribe may well fail to induce public officials to act in specific ways: 
for instance, due to bad luck, incompetence, or unwillingness to carry out Jane’s orders in 
this instance. But Jane’s helper will not necessarily fail again when Jane commits her third 
murder. Jane has created a system which continues to threaten and undermine an 
                                                                                                                
42 For an influential account see Richard W. Wright, “Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked 
Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts,” Iowa Law Review 73 (1988): 
1019. 
43 For defences of this view, see (amongst others) John Oberdiek, Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 84-91; Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays 
in Moral Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 181.  
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institution integral for well-functioning democratic states, and in turn, for states’ ability to 
ensure equal consideration for every citizen’s morally weighty interests by enforcing every 
citizen’s equal right to democratic participation. 
  The point about risks of harm is obviously not restricted to the specific political 
wrong of obstructing justice. Analogous points apply to electioneering (a helper has been 
hired so that if Jane ever runs for office, the helper rigs the votes in her favour and 
intimidates her opponents), as well as other types of political wrongdoing.  
  Importantly, ‘risks of harm’ already includes ‘actual harm’—my earlier point was 
simply that we should not narrow down the definition to include actual harm only, because 
many important instances of political wrongdoing involve inchoate offences. For 
illustrations of actual harm resulting from political wrongdoing, consider real cases of 
successful electoral fraud, such as vote buying, tampering with voting machines, intimidating 
or attacking people at polling stations, or systematically spreading misinformation about 
electoral procedures.  
  Impersonating someone else while voting might be another relevant actual harm. 
This type of voter fraud is often discussed in the public debate, and in a particularly 
sensationalist way, in the context of the 2016 US presidential election. Consider, for 
instance, Donald Trump’s statement—reported by CNN on April 5th, 2018, that “[i]n many 
places the same person in California votes many times […] Millions and millions of 
people”.44 But as many academic studies have shown, voter fraud of this kind is extremely 
rare in the recent US context. For example, as a 2007 report by the Brennan Center for 
Justice points out, “[i]t is more likely that an individual will be struck by lightning than that 
he will impersonate another voter at the polls”.45 Therefore, rare individual instances of 
voter fraud will typically not constitute large-scale political wrongdoing of the kind that I 
have in mind here.  
  Other significant examples of political wrongdoing include significant abuses of 
power by public officials, treason, and the funding of or participation in terrorist activities 
with the explicit aim of undermining democratic institutions; or the criminal misuse of 
economic participation rights,46 such as contributing financially to political campaigns above 
                                                                                                                
44 See Eli Watkins, “Trump Repeats Debunked Voter Fraud Claim,” CNN (April 5, 2018)   
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/05/politics/trump-voter-fraud-california/index.html  
45 Justin Levitt, “The Truth About Voter Fraud,” Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School 
of Law,  
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20Fraud.pdf, 
4. For a review of empirical studies regarding voter fraud in the US, which all support the view that voter 
fraud of this type is rare, see the 2014 Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, 
“Elections: Issues Related to State Voter Identification Laws”, http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665966.pdf.  
46 For further discussion see Annette Zimmermann, “Economic Participation Rights and the All-Affected 
Principle,” Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 10 (2017): 1-21. 
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legal limits, or transferring campaign funds from one campaign to another when the two 
ought to be legally separate.  
 
Wrongful Intentions47 
  My point about ‘wrongful intentions’ may seem puzzling at first sight. After all, why 
criminalise wrongful intentions—via criminal disenfranchisement or otherwise? What I 
have in mind here are intentions coupled with a plan, or, in Bratman’s terms, a “reflective 
endorsement”.48 In many paradigmatic cases of political wrongdoing, such a plan might 
involve thinking about which criminal acts (my own, or others’) must occur in order for me 
to benefit. In the context of political wrongdoing, I might plan how I will benefit from 
electioneering should I, or someone else, gain the power to engage in electioneering. Here, 
neither I nor anyone else has engaged in electioneering yet. But, critically, I have already 
endorsed the idea of benefitting from electioneering. Maybe I have planned how to increase 
my chances, or someone else’s, of gaining electioneering opportunities. The point is that I 
am not merely daydreaming about rigging elections. I have intentionally developed and 
reflectively endorsed a plan about how I can benefit from electioneering. Such a plan in 
itself is part of the actus reus. As Goodin and Pasternak put it, “the actions that practical 
intending involves (forming the intention or reflectively endorsing it) […] are not merely a 
precursor towards some subsequent ‘genuine’ doing but rather already part of that doing”.49 
  But when, and why, is the intention to benefit already part of the wrongful action, 
thus making the intention to benefit wrongful itself? Call a wrongful intention to benefit ξ. 
I would argue that intentions to benefit are wrongful, and thus constitute a necessary 
element of a sufficient set, if and only if the presence of such intentions makes a difference 
for whether a risk of harm, or actual harm, occurs. Consider  
  Jane for Mayor: Jane, Mary, and Kate are all running for mayor. Jane is  
  plotting to murder her opponent Mary. Kate is plotting to intimidate Mary  
  so that she drops out of the race. Kate becomes aware of Jane’s plans. Kate  
  intends to benefit from Jane’s action, and thus fails to warn Mary of her  
  imminent murder. In fact, Kate checks routinely whether Mary has been  
  murdered yet, which counts as a reflective endorsement of her intention to  
  benefit. 
                                                                                                                
47 Due to this restriction, the concept of political wrongdoing excludes acts of disobedience to the law with a 
non-wrongful intention, such as exercising one’s moral right to engage in civil disobedience with the aim of 
upholding justice. 
48 Michael E. Bratman, Structures of Agency: Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 22-5 and 33-
46. 
49 Robert E. Goodin and Avia Pasternak, “Intending to Benefit from Wrongdoing,” Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 15 (2016): 285. 
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Kate has never formed the wrongful intention φ to murder Mary herself. However, the fact 
that she has formed the wrongful intention ξ to benefit from Mary’s murder makes a 
difference to the situation. Ordinarily, a third agent who gains knowledge of a murder plot 
would attempt to prevent the murder, for example by sharing their knowledge with law 
enforcement, or by warning the prospective victim. And in fact, Kate might have done so 
before she formed intention ξ. But Kate is not an ordinary third agent. The fact that Kate 
formed ξ makes a difference for whether actual harm to Mary will occur, in comparison to 
a scenario in which Kate does not have ξ. As Goodin and Pasternak explain, when ξ is a 
NESS condition of φ, “ξ makes a modal difference. It makes it possible for wrongdoing φ 
to occur […]. That makes the [holder of ξ] potentially causally responsible for wrongdoing 
φ occurring and morally responsible for that”.50 
  Apart from illustrating this point about wrongful intentions (ξ) making a modal 
difference, Jane for Mayor also shows that the nature—not only the wrongfulness—of 
intentions matters for whether an act is an ordinary public wrong, or indeed a political 
wrong. Earlier, I used Jane the Murderer to illustrate exactly this distinction, arguing that 
standard mala in se crimes like murder are not primarily political. However, in this case, 
murder becomes part of political wrongdoing, such that the primary aim of the actus reus 
in Jane for Mayor is to circumvent fair democratic procedures. 
 Note that on my account, the class of ξ is not restricted to wrongful intentions to 
benefit, as long as the intention itself is wrongful and makes a modal difference for an 
associated wrongful act φ. An example might be an anarchist terrorist sabotaging 
democratic procedures and institutions with the sole aim of creating chaos. Here, the 
wrongful intention is vandalistic malice, rather than benefitting personally from their 
wrongful act, and it is plausible to assume that this wrongful intention is a difference-maker 
for a wrongful act φ (sabotaging the integrity of democratic institutions) much like a 
wrongful intention to benefit ξ would be a difference-maker. Thus, while wrongful 
difference-making intentions are a necessary element of a sufficient set of wrong-making 
features on this account, wrongful difference-making intentions to benefit are worse-
makers, not wrong-makers: they are aggravating but not necessary features of political 
wrongdoing.51   
                                                                                                                
50 Goodin and Pasternak, “Intending to Benefit from Wrongdoing,” 286. 
51 In what follows, I focus again on cases involving wrongful intentions to benefit, since such cases are a 
particularly good characterization of typical acts of political wrongdoing, yet this does not mean that my 
conceptual account is restricted to that subset of intentions. 
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 One definitional aspect remains: I say ‘harm caused (not necessarily by the political 
wrongdoer herself)’ because political wrongdoing often involves joint enterprises, or 
complicity in a larger scheme, where an individual political wrongdoer does not necessarily 
plan to execute the act leading to wrongful harm herself. Not all agents involved in political 
wrongdoing need to be directly causally responsible for its resulting harms, but they all 
intend to benefit from such acts. Consider 
  Jane’s Hitman: Jane is running for mayor. She hires a hitman to murder her  
  political opponent Mary. Jane’s hitman kills Mary. 
Both Jane and the hitman had wrongful intentions to benefit here, although only the hitman 
actually murdered Mary: the hitman anticipated a material reward for his own actions, and 
Jane anticipated a certain win. Note that on my account, it is strictly speaking not necessary 
that the political wrongdoer intends to do wrong (φ), either by committing the wrong herself 
or by working with other wrongdoers. It is merely necessary that she intends to benefit from 
any present or future political wrongdoing (φ), even if she did not intend to bring about the 
original wrong φ. My claim is that the wrongful intention to benefit (ξ) is conceptually 
distinct from the wrongful intention to commit a wrong (φ), and that, much like φ is wrong 
in and of itself, irrespective of the actual consequences, ξ is also wrongful in and of itself.52  
  My claim about ξ might be less intuitive than my claim about φ. To see how this 
thought plausibly applies to political wrongdoing in particular, consider 
 Big League Conspiracy: Officials of state R conspire with the staff of a  
  presidential campaign team T to influence an upcoming election in the US  
  by disseminating false information online. Meanwhile, officials of a third  
  country S contemplate the possibility of conspiring with the same team T  
  for the same reasons, since the political interests of R and S are aligned in  
  this case: both want the candidate of team T to win. However, R is unaware  
  of S’s activities. S, in turn, is aware of R’s activities. S therefore knows that,  
  because of R’s plans, S will likely achieve its aim of T winning the election.  
  S is willing to take the small chance that R may be unsuccessful in its  
  endeavour. Thus, S abandons the intention to take any action to support T.  
In Conspiracy, both R and S are political wrongdoers. However, R intends to do wrong (φ) 
and possesses the wrongful intention to benefit (ξ) from wrongdoing (φ); whereas S 
possesses only the latter intention (ξ). The latter suffices for fulfilling our ‘wrongful 
intentions’ criterion, because S would have supplemented an intention to benefit (ξ) with 
an intention to do wrong (φ) had R suddenly dropped out of the picture. Political 
                                                                                                                
52 For a related point, see Robert Fullinwider, “Preferential Hiring and Compensation,” Social Theory & 
Practice 3 (1975): 318: it is “wrong to seek out benefits from the wrongdoing of others, even if there is nothing 
wrong with unavoidably coming into possession of them”. 
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wrongdoing was unavoidable in this case in the sense that either R or S would have carried 
it out—it was not necessary for them to act together. What is interesting about Conspiracy, 
however, is that one agent’s knowledge about the presence of wrongful intentions (φ) 
altered their own intentions to commit wrongdoing (φ), but not their wrongful intentions 
to benefit from wrongdoing (ξ).   
IV.  Negative Retributivism In Context:    
  Constraints and Limitations 
1.  Developing the Negative Retributivist Argument 
  Why does negative retributivism justify the criminal disenfranchisement of political 
wrongdoers, and political wrongdoers only? Recall the first two parts of the negative 
retributivist argument—the restriction of the desert basis to crimes of type X and the 
compatibility claim—which I outlined earlier. Based on my account of the concept of 
political wrongdoing, we can now add: 
3.   Relevant Types of Wrongs: X denotes the domain of criminal 
wrongdoing. Crimes are public wrongs. But not all public wrongs are 
morally wrong primarily because they wrong the public, and specifically, 
the integrity of democratic institutions or procedures. Only political 
wrongdoing, a subset of public wrongs, is primarily wrong for this reason. 
Now, any negative retributivist justification of criminal disenfranchisement must introduce 
a (lack of) desert claim and a claim about temporary rights forfeiture:  
4.   Negative Retributivist Lack of Desert Claim: Wrongdoers guilty of 
public wrongs (crimes), but not of political wrongs, do not deserve to be 
punished by being temporarily disenfranchised (though they may 
deserve other kinds of punishment). 
5.   Negative Retributivist Temporary Forfeiture Claim: Political 
wrongdoers temporarily forfeit their right not to be punished via criminal 
disenfranchisement.53 
By drawing on higher-order democratic principles, negative retributivists can give substance 
to these claims. While negative retributivists—or any retributivists, for that matter—need not 
commit themselves to the claim that criminals necessarily temporarily forfeit exactly the 
right that they have violated, they must provide an argument to the effect that it would not 
be fitting to restrict some or all of the democratic participation rights of a criminal who is 
                                                                                                                
53 Although an ordinary language usage of the term ‘forfeiture’ might intuitively suggest a permanent loss of 
rights, the term is used more broadly in the relevant philosophical literature so as to include temporary losses 
of rights. See Christopher Heath Wellman, “The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,” Ethics 122 
(2012): 386.  
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not a political wrongdoer. The intuition underpinning such a ‘lack of desert’ claim is the 
following. If A’s crime had nothing do with democratic participation, did not inhibit the 
democratic participation of others, and was not pursued with the primary intention of 
eroding central democratic procedures and institutions, and possibly—though not 
necessarily—benefitting personally from doing so, it would not be fitting to punish A by 
depriving her of democratic participation rights, the exercise of which is entirely unrelated 
to her criminal conduct. Otherwise, the connection between the substantive nature of the 
sanction and the nature of the criminal conduct at stake would simply be too tenuous. 
Those insisting that A deserves criminal disenfranchisement must explain why 
disenfranchisement specifically is appropriate in this case. Why not (or not only) 
incarcerate A, fine A, or force A to do community service? Why not (or not only) publicly 
shame her? Deprive her of the right to buy and own guns, or the right to take up 
employment in the medical or educational sector? As López-Guerra argues, “[i]t would be 
difficult to argue that a person deserves to be deprived of the right to influence the making 
of all laws just for breaking one, or a few of them”.54 To this, negative retributivists like 
myself will add: “… unless the criminal has broken laws concerning the integrity of 
democratic institutions, which ensure that everyone else can influence the making of all 
laws during legitimate democratic procedures, and that everyone’s right to do so is 
protected equally.” While criminals who commit public wrongs that are not primarily 
wrong because they wrong the public in this way lack the kind of desert necessary for 
showing that they temporarily forfeit their right not to be punished via criminal 
disenfranchisement, political wrongdoers do not lack this kind of desert. On my account, 
the desert basis (political wrongdoing) is thus closely linked to the desert object 
(disenfranchisement) in an intuitively clear way.55 Negative retributivists must restrict 
justifiable criminal disenfranchisement to political wrongdoers, and political wrongdoers 
only.  
                                                                                                                
54 López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement, 116. 
55 Here, I am relying on influential terminology in Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), 55-94, where he defines “[d]esert bases [as follows:] if a person is deserving 
of some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily, be so in virtue of some possessed characteristic or prior 
activity” (58). Some will of course simply not share my intuition that the connection between non-political 
criminal wrongdoing and the sanction of criminal disenfranchisement is too tenuous, and that the connection 
between political wrongdoing and disenfranchisement is sufficiently non-tenuous. Negative retributivism 
might therefore seem overly restrictive. In that case, the debate about the appropriate desert basis for criminal 
disenfranchisement leads to an impasse, since evaluations of desert bases must always to some extent rely on 
intuitionistic reasoning. Ultimately, my discussion here may nevertheless be useful for those denying the 
intuitive force of my negative retributivist account in the sense that my account helps clarify one amongst 
several possible stances on criminal disenfranchisement, and presents a systematic conceptual analysis of a 
possible desert basis (political wrongdoing), which no other contributor to this debate has to my knowledge 
done so far. I am indebted to Annie Stilz and Tom Christiano for pushing me to clarify this. 
 
 24 
  Compare negative retributivism to the positive retributivist stance, which relies on a 
positive desert claim to justify the disenfranchisement of criminals irrespective of the 
precise nature (including the intentions and possible harms) of their wrongdoing. Positive 
retributivists could incorporate my concept of political wrongdoing into their account, and 
then introduce additional normative principles to restrict their account to political 
wrongdoers only. This might yield similar results—it would justify the criminal 
disenfranchisement of the same group of people—but it would do so for different—and in 
my view, wrong—reasons: as I have argued above, positive retributivism is not the most 
plausible account available for justifying criminal disenfranchisement, for reasons unrelated 
to restricting the account’s scope. Thus, I continue to endorse negative retributivism 
specifically here. Analogous arguments apply to the expressivist account: due to the internal 
tensions in the expressivist justification of the specific punitive sanction of criminal 
disenfranchisement, which would persist even if the account were restricted to political 
wrongdoers, expressivism remains less plausible than my negative retributivist justification 
for criminal disenfranchisement. 
  Having reached the preliminary conclusion that some criminals—political 
wrongdoers—temporarily forfeit their right not to be punished via criminal 
disenfranchisement, we still have to show why the criminal disenfranchisement of political 
wrongdoers is justified.56  Such a justification must be compatible with the morally weighty 
democratic presumption in favour of universal suffrage: any disenfranchisement policy’s 
purpose must be to ultimately enable the enforcement of that presumption, which is why 
the justification must be restricted to incapacitating and deterring political wrongdoers in 
pursuit of the goal of protecting the integrity of the democratic institutions enabling equal 
democratic participation in the first place. 
6.   Positive Instrumentalist Justification for Disenfranchisement: 57   
 
a.   Protecting the integrity of democratic institutions and 
procedures is a valuable goal because doing so is important for 
securing the equal rights of democratic citizens.  
b.   Criminal disenfranchisement by definition requires the 
restriction of the right to participate in democratic decisions.   
 
                                                                                                                
56 Note that this is not a claim about all-things-considered justifiability, given that additional constraints will be 
specified below. 
57 Many other contributors to the debate on negative retributivism agree that combining retributivist elements 
with instrumentalist ones is a plausible strategy. For an overview of accounts that take this stance, see Mitchell 
N. Berman, “Two Kinds of Retributivism,” in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law, eds. R. A. Duff 
and Stuart P. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 433-59. 
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c.   Such restrictions are justified iff, and because, they serve the aim 
of protecting the integrity of democratic institutions or 
procedures. 
Of course, not all political wrongdoers will be effectively deterred, and temporarily 
incapacitated, by criminal disenfranchisement: an election-rigging public official will 
continue to rig elections even if she loses her individual right to vote. This is why (c) is 
phrased conditionally. Suppose now that our election-rigging official can only rig elections 
because of her privileged access to voting machines and administrative procedures related 
to the electoral process: simply being a public official is a constitutive element of her 
election-rigging efforts. Here, disenfranchising her by revoking democratic participation 
rights other than the right to vote, such as her right to remain in office, and perhaps her 
right to run for office again, effectively incapacitates her while the punitive sanction of 
disenfranchisement is in place, and it may deter her and other future political wrongdoers 
from rigging elections.  
  A sceptical reader may ask: if citizens’ liberty rights are conditional on their rights-
respecting conduct, why are citizens’ democratic participation rights not similarly 
conditional? Must the fittingness link be similarly close when we justify incarceration, given 
that individual liberty’s value is also rather high, much like the value of political inclusion? 
The view that there must be a tight fittingness link may seem implausibly restrictive, given 
that it may imply that only those criminals who have infringed on another person’s liberty 
deserve a punitive restriction of their own liberty. But most would agree that we need an 
account of punishment that explains why incarcerating a wide range of serious criminals is 
permissible. Note that just because the imposition of punishments like disenfranchisement 
and incarceration is similarly conditional, this does not imply that the fittingness link must 
be equally tight in both cases, such that we would have to incarcerate and disenfranchise all 
serious criminals as part of a single punitive package. The lines can and should be drawn 
differently for each type of punishment, depending on the nature of the criminal conduct 
at stake in each case, and conditional on independent normative criteria going beyond a 
similarity claim. One such criterion is the moral requirement not to impose unnecessary, 
excessive punishments. In the case of incarceration, that criterion might be the effective 
incapacitation of criminals, in which case incarceration would not be unnecessary and 
excessive. By contrast, disenfranchisement would be unnecessary for serious criminals not 
guilty of political wrongdoing, who have not endangered the integrity of democratic 
institutions in a sufficiently encompassing way. Local rights violations, even morally serious 
ones like murder, do not have this significant effect of endangering the entire democratic 
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system as such. Negative retributivism, then, is not an eye-for-an-eye view: it does not 
demand that we deprive each criminal of exactly the right they have violated. But it does 
require that we do not ‘pile on’ excessive punishments on people as a ‘package’. Each part 
of a punitive package must be justified individually via a desert-independent positive 
instrumentalist justification, and if criminal disenfranchisement is unnecessary for serving 
plausible instrumentalist aims, it is not justified. 
2.  Sentencing Constraints: Proportionality and Fairness  
Proportionality 
  For negative retributivists, proportionality is a necessary sentencing constraint58 
because it protects negative retributivism’s forward-looking instrumentalist component 
from the pitfalls of pure forward-looking theories like deterrence accounts, such as allowing 
the disproportionate punishment of the guilty as well as the punishment of the innocent.59 
In contrast to a non-comparative notion of cardinal proportionality, ordinal proportionality 
involves multidimensional comparative assessments of available punishments. Following 
von Hirsch’s account of ordinal proportionality,60 I define these criteria as follows: 
  Parity: “when offenders have been convicted of crimes of similar seriousness  
  they deserve penalties of comparable severity”.   
  Rank Ordering: “[the] relative severity [of punishment] reflects the  
  seriousness-ranking of the crimes involved”.   
  Spacing: “Suppose crimes X, Y, and Z are of ascending order of seriousness;  
  but that Y is considerably more serious than X but only slightly less so than  
  Z. Then, to reflect the conduct’s gravity, there should be a larger space  
  between the penalties for X and Y than for Y and Z”. 
 
One way of making the disenfranchisement ordinally proportionate is to ensure parity for 
political wrongdoers guilty of similar kinds of wrongdoing (e.g. obstruction of justice with 
respect to the same institutional body). But whenever this is not possible, we can 
approximate at least rank ordering and spacing by depriving political wrongdoers of 
different kinds of participation rights. For instance, when sentencing two political 
wrongdoers guilty of qualitatively different crimes (such as conspiring with a hostile foreign 
power vis-à-vis bribing a local county official), restricting the right to vote for both political 
wrongdoers may be inconsistent with rank ordering. It may thus be more proportionate to 
deprive the former political official not only of her right to vote in local elections, but also 
                                                                                                                
58 Importantly, this implies that criminal disenfranchisement ought to be (contrary to current practice) an 
explicit part of sentencing, rather than a mere collateral consequence automatically applied to all offenders 
convicted of a particular crime. 
59 On a similar point see Lippke, “Some Surprising Implications of Negative Retributivism,” 53. 
60 Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 18. 
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her right to run for office in a given election cycle, thus serving the incapacitative aim of 
preventing further conspiracy or obstructions of justice by elected officials. It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to defend a complete account of how to achieve an ordinal ranking of 
different types of political wrongdoing, and a corresponding ordinal ranking of temporarily 
forfeitable participation rights that applies to all possible sentencing contexts. My point is 
simply that, in principle, we can feed comparative considerations concerning the moral 
seriousness of different types of political wrongdoing into a context-specific, ordinally 
proportionate judgment about which specific democratic participation rights a given 
political wrongdoer temporarily forfeits. 
Fairness 
  A concern for fairness may constrain the scope of all-things-considered justified 
criminal disenfranchisement in two different ways: first, disenfranchisement must not be an 
unfair kind of punishment itself, and second, disenfranchisement must not exacerbate the 
adverse impact of structurally unfair background conditions such as racial injustice. 
  The scope of a punishment—the set of temporarily forfeited rights—can vary 
depending on the empirical context in which a punishment is imposed, and on whether the 
actual sentence adequately reflects that context. For example, contrast disenfranchising a 
prisoner between elections, so that the loss of voting rights remains inconsequential in the 
sense that there would have been no opportunity to exercise it,61 with disenfranchising a 
prisoner whose sentence overlaps with elections.62 Asymmetries may occur even if 
everything else is held constant—the severity of the crime, the length of the prison sentence, 
the kind of punishment imposed. So even ostensibly de jure fair punishments may be unfair 
de facto due to arbitrarily different effects,63 which courts must prevent and mitigate: for 
example, by disenfranchising only those criminals whose prison sentence exceeds the 
duration of one election period, so that all criminals disenfranchised in that jurisdiction will 
experience the same punitive effect—not being able to vote—at least once, irrespective of 
when they are sentenced, the latter of which is a morally arbitrary empirical fact.  
  Consider also the separate, and more complex, issue of unfair background 
conditions. Members of racial minorities are disproportionately impacted by stop-and-frisk 
                                                                                                                
61 But disenfranchisement may still be objectionable all-things-considered even if it does not actually lead to a 
tangible loss of participation rights due to a lack of opportunities to exercise them, since it may nevertheless 
entail a morally objectionable loss of equal social standing. 
62 See Nicholas Munn, “The Limits of Criminal Disenfranchisement,” Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (2011): 223-
39. 
63 Susan Easton, “Electing the Electorate: The Problem of Prisoner Disenfranchisement,” The Modern Law 
Review 69 (2006): 445-8; and Hirst v. UK, §76. 
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policies,64 are more likely to be arrested,65 and are “nearly twice as likely to be charged with 
an offense carrying a mandatory minimum sentence”,66 even when controlling for a 
criminal’s individual characteristics and criminal history. They are thus more likely to 
receive a sentence entailing criminal disenfranchisement as a collateral consequence. This 
disparate impact is in tension with existing laws,67 such as section 2 of the US Voting Rights 
Act (1965), which prohibit restrictions of the electorate if such restrictions 
disproportionately decrease a minority’s equal opportunities to influence political 
outcomes via voting.68 This applies, as the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act 
clarifies, irrespective of whether the intent of such restrictions is discriminatory—what 
matters is the discriminatory effect. This suggests that regardless of why and how unfair 
background conditions arise, once they exist courts must consider them when determining 
the appropriate scope of punishment during sentencing:69 for instance, by considering a 
criminal’s personal background, and by determining whether the proposed punishment 
matches punishments imposed on criminals from different backgrounds in a fair and 
potentially more lenient way, in light of racial bias in policing and sentencing.  
  Of course, doing so would neither compensate for the historical and ongoing 
presence of structural injustice, nor address its sources directly. However, it would help 
avoid exacerbating structural injustice further via disenfranchisement policies with an unfair 
political impact. Ultimately, the relevant question we must pose when we decide whether 
to implement the negative retributivist account of criminal disenfranchisement all things 
considered is whether we are in an empirical context in which any disenfranchisement 
policy, even a severely restricted one, would end up exacerbating racial injustice, and other 
structurally unjust inequalities. If that was the case, this would constitute an overriding 
                                                                                                                
64 See this recent study published by the criminal justice reform organisation The Sentencing Project: Nazgol 
Ghandnoosh, “Black Lives Matter: Eliminating Racial Inequity in the Criminal Justice System” (2013), 
https://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_Black_Lives_Matter.pdf, 3. 
65 The same study finds that in Ferguson, Missouri, African-Americans were twice as likely to be arrested after 
being stopped in traffic. This disparity is particularly alarming given that the study also found that police 
stopped more black persons than white persons (12% vs. 7%) in the first place, but found less contraband 
with black persons (22%) than white persons (34%). The report drew on data by the Office of the Missouri 
Attorney General, including Racial Profiling data (2013) by Ferguson PD, http://ago.mo.gov/docs/default-
source/public-safety/2013agencyreports.pdf?sfvrsn=2  
66 Sonja B. Starr and M. Marit Rehavi, “Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of 
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker,” The Yale Law Journal 123 (2013): 28-9. 
67 Karlan, “Convictions and Doubts”, 1147-70. 
68 The relevant parts of section 2 are: “(a) No voting qualification […] shall be imposed […] which results in a 
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color [...]. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if […]the political processes leading to nomination or election 
[…] are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens […]  in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.” Voting Rights Act of 1965 (1982 amendment), 52 U.S.C. 10101 (2018) 
[emphases added]. 
69 For a related argument see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). 
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reason not to implement the policy, thus trumping the negative retributivist account and 
any other justification of criminal disenfranchisement.  
  Acknowledging possible overriding reasons not to disenfranchise anyone is 
compatible with my account: the negative retributivist argument does not provide a context-
insensitive justification for why it is all things considered justified for democratic states to 
disenfranchise political wrongdoers. The argument merely specifies which narrow set of 
criminals temporarily forfeit their right not to be punished by disenfranchisement, but I 
have not attempted to develop a full account of whether that argument outweighs competing 
moral reasons not to disenfranchise, such as reasons pertaining to the goal of establishing 
overall fair conditions in a democratic state.      
  
V.  Conclusion 
  Widespread current disenfranchisement policies disenfranchise the wrong set of 
people. They are overinclusive, because they disenfranchise persons guilty of serious, but 
non-political, criminal wrongdoing. While overinclusiveness would be objectionable in any 
context, it is particularly objectionable in circumstances in which failing to articulate a 
plausible narrow desert basis for criminal disenfranchisement has additional large-scale 
collateral consequences, for instance by perpetuating existing structures of racial inequality 
and exclusion. At the same time, existing disenfranchisement policies are also 
underinclusive, because they fail to disenfranchise some persons guilty of serious political 
wrongdoing, thus failing to articulate appropriate punitive sanctions which would help hold 
political wrongdoers accountable. 
  I have argued for this view by critiquing deterrentist, expressivist, and positive 
retributivist justifications of criminal disenfranchisement—including justifications of 
temporary criminal disenfranchisement—and by developing an alternative, severely 
restricted negative retributivist account. Importantly, the negative retributivist justification is 
not an all-things-considered justification, which is why it is subject to context-specific 
constraints and responsive to overriding reasons. Furthermore, the negative retributivist 
account is not committed to the view that criminal disenfranchisement is the best way of 
responding to the political wrongdoing: other measures may be more effective or more 
desirable, morally and politically speaking. Nevertheless, the more constructive upshot of 
the argument is that we have strong, yet underacknowledged reasons to question the 
underlying intuitions of those accounts of criminal disenfranchisement which currently 
dominate the philosophical debate—and those reasons point us towards approaching the 
question of whether we ought to disenfranchise anyone with much more nuance and 
scepticism.  
